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Abstract.
BACKGROUND: Air transportation of personnel to offshore oil platforms is one of the major hazards of this kind of endeavor. 
Pilot performance is a key factor in the safety of the transportation system.
OBJECTIVE: This study seeks to identify the ergonomic factors present in pilots’ activities that may in some way compromise 
or enhance their performance, the constraints and affordances which they are subject to; and where possible to link these to their 
associated risk factors
METHODS: Methodology adopted in this project studies work in its context. It is a merging of Activity Analysis (Guerin et al. 
2001) of European tradition with Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA -  www.ctaresource.com) articulated with the recent approaches 
to cognitive systems engineering developed by Professors David Woods and Erik Hollnagel. Fifty-five hours of field interviews 
provided the input for analysis.
RESULTS: Sixteen ergonomic constraints were identified, some cognitive, some physical, all considered relevant by the research 
subjects and expert advisers
CONCLUSIONS: Although the safety record of the personnel transportation system studied is considered acceptable, there is 
low hanging fruit to be picked which can help improve the system’s safety.
Keywords: Cognitive ergonomics, cognitive task analysis, safety, helicopter operation
1. Introduction
The notion that accidents and incidents are caused 
by human errors or mechanical failures is widespread. 
It still guides much of what is done in the safety do­
main, but we must recognize that in com plex systems, 
conditions may em erge where certain outcom es com e 
to be beyond the reach o f operators’ actions [1], C om ­
ing to grips with the idea that accidents can be primed 
by com plex socio-technical systems designed or oper­
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ating inadequately relative to the capabilities o f their 
human operators, especially in regard to aspects o f 
their cognition, is an im portant first step in building re­
silient and safe systems [2,3].
This study seeks to identify instances where, in their 
eyes, helicopter pilo ts’ work taxes them unduly or un­
necessarily, working from the prem ise that ergonomic 
aspects o f critical w ork can have an impact on the 
safety o f that work. This research uses a cognitive en­
gineering [4] framework to study the operational con­
ditions in which pilots carry out their work and to as­
sess them ergonomically.
About 80% o f the oil extracted in Brazil comes 
from this Basin, located a 3 hour drive north of Rio 
de Janeiro city, and approxim ately 400 pilots and co-
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pilots working for 9 helicopter companies transport 
about 40,000 people who work on ships and plat­
forms every month, in 6,300 helicopter flights. These 
large numbers provide the motivation for the research 
project of which the ergonomic component of pilots’ 
activities is reported here. The main goal of the project 
is to analyze and discover how the transportation sys­
tem is resilient and brittle given the workload demands 
and economic pressures. The ergonomic analysis un­
covered factors that impose demands upon the pilots’ 
and some of their strategies for coping with them.
Flying helicopters in the personnel transportation 
service for the offshore oil and gas exploration and pro­
duction operations in the Campos Basin is a demand­
ing activity associated with one of the major hazards 
of this kind of endeavor. In the Campos Basin, the off­
shore platforms are located about 100 km from the 
coast, and this transport has resulted in several acci­
dents. These accidents were related to helideck opera­
tions and helicopter failure during flight.
This research uses ergonomic methods to examine 
constraints associated with pilot’s work in the heli­
copter transportation system for the Campos Basin oil 
fields in Brazil. The study team carried out and ana­
lyzed 55 hours of interviews with aviators (pilots, co­
pilots, and managers) of some of the main helicopter 
companies. The initial objective of the research pro­
gram was to map the constraints to which air-crew 
are subjected in the course of their daily activities. 
Constraints are factors that in some way hamper what 
is done or how things are done, and are the object 
of various coping strategies. As a general rule these 
factors can contribute to undesirable system occur­
rences, generating micro incidents [5], but they are in­
sufficient, in isolation, to provoke incidents or acci­
dents [6]. Nonetheless, the aggregate load and/or wear 
and tear generated by the accumulation of many small 
constraints under the faster, better, cheaper organiza­
tional environment can impact system performance 
and safety [7], and be the cause of great losses. One of 
the fronts for progress on safety therefore depends on 
providing conditions which mitigate these constraints, 
including identifying the safety/production tradeoffs 
made by people during their daily work [8],
2. Methods
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) based on field stud­
ies is the natural methodological framework for this 
study. CTA is a ubiquitous description for a number of
methods used to elicit knowledge from professionals in 
specific domains. According to Crandall et al. [9] CTA 
is a set of methods to study and describe reasoning and 
knowledge in context. These studies include the oper­
ators’ activities of perceiving and attending that under­
lie performance of tasks, the cognitive skills and strate­
gies needed to deal with complex situations, as well 
as the purposes, goals, and motivations for cognitive 
work [9].
Among these methods, we adopted the Ergonomic 
Work Analysis (EWA), an approach used by the French 
ergonomics school (e.g. De Keyser and Nyssen [10]), 
based on activity theory (Engenstron [11]), in which 
the subjects are observed/intervie- wed in their actual 
work setting.
This qualitative ethnographic framework implies 
that the researcher collect empirical data while inter­
acting with people under study. The observation/inter- 
viewing in situ implies the daily taking of field notes 
(supported by electronic media -  audio and video 
recording) that record naturally occurring talks and in­
teractions between observed actors. Particularly, we 
want to stress that this method of field observation is 
especially suitable for study of work organization is­
sues, enabling access to the backstage activities where 
workers hold the tacit competencies that make possi­
ble all the cooperative strategies essential to the ac­
complishment of daily work. This strategy of gathering 
data allows grasping the vivid social scenes with ac­
companying conflicts, misunderstandings, processes of 
negotiation among actors, creations of consensual ar­
rangements to disrespect prescriptive rules ... that of­
ten come together with jargons, gestures, jokes, and so 
forth.
Finally, ethnographic research assumes that there is 
no independence between the collection of empirical 
and all the interactions that occur between the field ob­
server and the insiders. This is to say that all these in­
teractions, occurring between the researcher and peo­
ple under study, have to be considered as empirical data 
that will be classified as part of the theoretical analysis.
2.1. Research setting: Campos Basin oil and gas 
exploration
The sedimentary area known as Campos Basin cov­
ers an area of around 60,000 square miles on the north­
ern coast of Rio de Janeiro state. On shore, the bound­
aries of the basin are outlined by the hills surrounding 
it. More than a thousand oil and gas wells, 38 fixed 
and mobile production platforms, over 2,500 miles of
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submarine pipelines, production of more than a million 
barrels of oil and 15.7 million cubic meters of gas per 
day, which is around 80% and 42% of the national pro­
duction, respectively, operate in dozens of oil fields. 
With most of the fields 100 kilometers or more from 
shore, the production platforms have been designed 
as self-contained units with their own power supplies 
and accommodation for staff and the helicopter trans­
portation system has become the only option available, 
mainly due to the lower transportation time when com­
paring to the older catamaran transportation system.
To explore different kinds of oil and gas fields and 
for different types of exploration and production ac­
tivities there are many different platform types, re­
quiring different helicopter landing approaches. The 
main types of platform used are fixed platforms, jack­
up platforms, semi-submersible platforms, drill ships, 
and Floating production, storage and offloading vessels 
(FPSO) platforms.
2.2. Sample characterization
The sample we studied was defined by combination 
of opportunity and intent: opportunity since we could 
only interview volunteer pilots who were on duty but 
not flying, a routine and fairly common situation which 
arises from aircraft unavailability; intent as from the 
available pilots we could have made choices seeking to 
maintain a balance of company roles among the partic­
ipants in our study. It turned out that the pilot mix and 
numbers available closely matched our planned sample 
profile and size, and all comers were interviewed.
Although for the full study other categories were 
interviewed, only the aviator category and its sub­
categories are reported on here due to our focus on er­
gonomics in this paper. The category descriptions are 
presented below:
Aviators: Everyone licensed to fly helicopters, in­
cluding pilots, co-pilots, and operating company 
managers whose job descriptions required them to 
hold a valid pilot’s license (pilots +  co-pilots); 
Pilots: Everyone licensed to command a helicopter 
and cleared to do so by their companies, and who 
occupy helicopter operating company pilot or avi­
ator management positions; 
Pilots/non-management: Pilots charged only with 
flying and commanding helicopters, with no man­
agement or statutory responsibilities beyond their 
aircraft;
Pilots/management: Pilots with management or 
statutory responsibilities within a helicopter oper­
ating company (equipment chief, flight coordina­
tor, etc.);
Co-pilots: Licensed helicopter pilots assigned to 
the co-pilot role by the companies due factors such 
as not having met the company’s time with the 
company requirement, the contractor’s time in the 
basin requirement, or lack of available pilot posi­
tions in the company. It is not unusual for a co-pilot 
to be more experienced and/or qualified than fellow 
pilots.
Breakdowns of the category sizes in the research set­
ting and in the research sample, and allocated research 
efforts are presented below.
The interview times presented reflect the research 
effort dedicated to each role. That there is difference 
between interview times to interviewee times is due to 
the fact that some sessions interviewed more than one 
participant simultaneously. This difference is adjusted 
for in the interviewee count considered when calculat­
ing the mean interview durations. The data reflect the 
fact that the co-pilots were more forthcoming and ea­
ger to participate and as a rule made more time avail­
able than the pilots, and that among the pilots, the ones 
holding management positions did likewise relative to 
those only flying.
2.3. Data collection
2.3.1. Getting situated: Regulatory structure o f the 
activity
To prepare for their data collection interviews with 
operators, presented in more detail below, the research 
group familiarized itself with their activity’s regulatory 
structure, through interviews with two Commanders, 
both flight safety consultants. In addition to other in­
formation, the flight safety consultants listed the offi­
cial bodies with regulatory authority over the activity, 
the set of rules, regulations, and laws that govern the 
activity, and briefly presented the contractual relation­
ships between the service users and the helicopter op­
erating companies, and between these and the aviators. 
The network of governing bodies, companies, rules, 
and regulations that establish the framework in which 
pilot’s activities are carried out was mapped out by the 
research team and the resultant diagram validated by 
the consultants.
2.3.2. Field work: Helicopter operators report on 
their activity
Once the relevant parts (for purposes of this study) 
of the Regulations had been studied, the group set out
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Table 1
Sample composition: interviewee roles
Sample classes Numbers of members in 
each class sample
Class size as a (%) 
of total sample
Class participation in 
its super-class (%)
Number of elements in each 
class of Campos basin
Interview time 
(HH:MM)
Aviators 20 100 100 400 55:00
Pilots 13 65 65 200 24:20
Management 6 30 46 56 12:15
Non-mgmt. 7 35 54 144 12:05
Co-Pilots 7 35 35 200 30:40
Table 2
Interview time for each interviewee role
Sample classes Interview time 
(HH:MM)
Class interview time 
as a percentage of total 
interview time (%)
Class interview time 
as a percentage of its super-class 
interview time (%)
Interviewee count 
considered in mean 
calculation
Mean interview 
duration 
(HH:MM)
Aviators 55:00 100 100 17 3:14
Pilots 24:20 44 44 10 2:26
Management 12:15 22 50 4 3:04
Non-Mgmt. 12:05 22 50 6 2:01
Co-Pilots 30:40 56 56 7 4:23
to establish contact with aviators engaged in the Cam­
pos Basin passenger transportation helicopter flying 
activity using cognitive task analysis techniques [9].
Field data collection was mainly conducted through 
extensive interviews with operators (active pilots and 
co-pilots) that were recorded, and the recordings were 
later transcribed. Due to the aircrafts’ restricted cabin 
space and cargo capacity, and to the lack of contractor’s 
consent, the team had no opportunity to make direct in 
flight observations of airmen’s activities. In addition to 
aviators, other participants in the air transport system 
that interact with them were interviewed at the same or 
lesser depth. All participants were volunteers.
During the interviews, the interviewers took notes 
of the issues raised by the interviewees, and immedi­
ately afterwards took the time to discuss the content 
of the interview among themselves, and to write their 
hot-reports. In the exceptional cases where respondents 
preferred that their interviews, or parts thereof, not be 
recorded, more detailed notes than usual were made.
The starting point was the search for detailed under­
standing of pilots’ activities and routine work. To do 
so, semi-structured interviews were conducted with pi­
lots, co-pilots, and other helicopter operator company 
personnel over two three month periods a year apart. 
With few exceptions, meetings were held at the Macae 
Airport in Macae, RJ. The interviews were conducted 
in an informal and relaxed tone, intended leave pi­
lots at ease and to promote frank disclosure. With par­
ticipants’ permission, the conversations were recorded 
and later transcribed for a better use of the information. 
Several short intervals were left unrecorded by request.
Recurring issues became apparent within the first in­
terviews. To validate these and other issues that were
mentioned, we used other interviews, followed up with 
further reading, and also conferred with domain ex­
perts.
As the study progressed several things changed. The 
structure of the interviews evolved over the period of 
field studies. In every interview there was an initial pe­
riod to break the ice, for questions and answers about 
the research, its motivation, methods, goals, and pa­
trons, and to discuss topics such as confidentiality of 
the interviews and traceability of sources. In the early 
interviews, the initial period was followed by a pe­
riod of free interaction, to a large degree conducted by 
the interviewees for an audience of attentive listeners 
(us analysts). In the later interviews, the initial period 
was followed by a period of structured open questions 
raised by the interviewers and another dedicated to the 
review (validation) of interim findings through joint 
discussion of draft activity diagrams and the list of con­
straints presented by the research team. Even during 
the more structured parts of the interviews, researchers 
remained alert and ready to allow the necessary oppor­
tunities for new topics to emerge. After discussing the 
activity diagrams and constraints list, there was an in­
formal and unstructured short break for rapport, saying 
thank yous, and goodbyes.
The interviews were conducted many to many, many 
to one, one to many and one to one, as dictated by 
circumstances and/or by interviewee wishes. We noted 
interesting differences in the dynamics of the different 
types of interview and questioned their impact on the 
methodological validity of the elicited data. We con­
cluded that these differences within the study sample 
and in the context of a more qualitative than quantita-
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tive study, were not relevant in the scope of this project, 
and did not compromise the data.
We believe these differences could in and of them­
selves be an interesting element of study. It remains to 
be determined whether the memory and verbalization 
stimuli provided by the more ‘conversation’ than ‘in­
terview’ format and the counterpoint of withdrawl and 
competition due to the presence of others have a net 
positive or negative effect.
Rather than focusing on how work should be done 
(the prescribed rules and tasks), we aim to understand 
how the work is being done and why it is being done in 
that particular way. This approach recognizes the vari­
ability of the workers’ activities and that their options-  
what, when and how to do some action -  are afforded 
and constrained by the work environment. To reconcile 
the affordances and constraints of the work environ­
ment with their own capabilities and limitations, work­
ers can generate a large variety of work patterns in­
cluding novel behaviors and innovations in work prac­
tices, which must be monitored to identify production/ 
safety implications. Although there are different types 
of constraints rooted at various levels within the orga­
nization and the overall system that can shape work­
ers’ behavior, allowing for several dimensions of anal­
ysis, the results reported here focus on the constraints 
and conditions of pilots’ work activities in the con­
text of their companies’ sociotechnical conditions as 
determined by their investments, maintenance, etc., 
and their management of human resources, including 
salary and work rules, as determined by their social 
policies, work organization procedures, training, etc.
To accommodate characteristics of the pilots’ work 
activities, interview methods were used, avoiding the 
logistical complications that direct observation of pi­
lots’ work activities would entail. The subjects (heli­
copter pilots and co-pilots and people in different orga­
nizational roles) were systematically interviewed. In­
terviews were recorded with their consent and tran­
scribed to facilitate data analysis. The entire research 
was done with the support of expert consultants in off­
shore aviation operations. The final results were vali­
dated with pilots, companies, and with the service con­
tractor (the oil company) staff.
3. Results
The data collected in the field lend themselves to dif­
ferent types of analysis and objectives, and we expect 
that uses will be found for them beyond the scope of
this work. In a previous article [10] our focus was the 
pilots’ sacrifice decisions to take off or not when con­
fronted with flaws in the equipment. In this article we 
describe the main constraints which pilots flying heli­
copters transporting passengers offshore in the Cam­
pos Basin are subject to, mentioned most frequently by 
respondents.
3.1. A map o f the constraints to pilots’ activities
Throughout the pilot interview process there were 
a number of recurring issues. These issues began to 
emerge as being vital to proper system operation and 
we identified them as indicators of where to focus our 
analysis. These are constraints (see Fig. 1), factors that 
tax operators’ performance and can contribute to un­
desirable occurrences within the system. In general, an 
isolated constraint is not capable of causing an inci­
dent, nor an accident, but the accumulated demands 
placed on operators by many constantly present con­
straints may cause large losses.
Identification of the constraints to pilots’ activities 
is per se an important step toward correcting and elim­
inating the recurring risk they represent, but safety of­
ficers and other professionals involved in the system 
must take note of these constraints and act so that in 
due course solutions can be developed to mitigate or 
extinguish them.
3.2. Roll o f constraints, exceptions, accommodations, 
and differences between activities as prescribed 
and as practiced
Below we present a list of constraints obtained from 
the transcription and analysis of the interviews, about 
which there is broad agreement among the personnel 
involved, and, when possible, illustrated by represen­
tative quotes from the interviews.
3.2.1. Physical environment
3.2.1.1. Local weather and atmospheric conditions 
“( . . .)  when it is raining or very windy (...) , we 
must go to an alternative airport. We must contact 
the [air traffic] control all the time to know about 
the weather conditions, then calculate the amount 
of fuel necessary... this is stressful and increases 
our workload ( . . . ) ”
“( . . .)  sometimes the wind is coming from the op­
posite direction when landing, pushing you off the 
platform, that is tough.. . ( . . . ) ”
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Fig. 1. Pilots’ Activities’ Constraints Map (by authors).
Fig. 2. Increase of bird-aircraft collisions 1996-2011. (Source: CENIPA website).
Adverse weather conditions that hamper maneuvers, 
especially landing, are a factor that causes crews great 
stress. The region where the platforms are located is 
susceptible to high winds. Dense fog is often present, 
causing great loss of visibility. These weather con­
ditions are not easy to predict. Pilots gather weather 
reports before starting their flights, and communicate 
with radio operators and the three air traffic controllers 
stationed aboard rigs offshore, but these procedures 
are not sufficient to avoid unpleasant surprises such as 
coming across a region of dense fog while operating on
information that visibility there is adequate. The lack 
of visibility may be such as to leave the pilot uncom­
fortable with the safety of his situation and cause him 
to abort the flight. When this happens, the pilot may be 
subject to even greater discomfort from appearing to 
be malingering.
Another serious concern is the formation of pockets 
of hot air near the landing sites. This is due to the pres­
ence of exhaust vents near the helipads. If an aircraft 
comes across one of these regions of instability and 
reduced support during its landing approach, it drops
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abruptly, forcing the pilot to deploy “over torque”, a 
condition where the turbines are overloaded and which 
may lead to an accident.
3.2.1.2. Bird collision risk
“( . . .)  Seagulls are the biggest problem, because 
they’re really stupid and will fly right at you, and 
won’t keep away. Buzzards see a helicopter and 
quickly get away, but seagulls don’t. They come 
for it, and if there’s a collision it can be a serious 
problem ( . . . ) ”
“( . . .)  Yesterday a pilot died in Angra and it seems 
it was a bird that hit the pilot and wound up causing 
the accident. . . ”
A bird strike is an important incident causing fac­
tor (see Fig. 2). Despite the growing efforts of govern­
mental and non-governmental organizations, the num­
ber of reported collisions has increased over the years. 
Improper land-use near airfields, for activities such as 
open garbage dumps, slaughterhouses, and fish land­
ing sites, attracts ever larger numbers of birds to their 
vicinity, which increases the risk of incidents.
Statistics indicate that over 80% of bird strikes occur 
during takeoff, approach, or landing maneuvers, which 
confirms that the presence of birds near airfields con­
stitutes a real threat to pilots and passengers.
There is a standard set by the National Environ­
ment Advisory Board for Airport Safety Areas, regions 
around the airfields where activities that attract birds 
are banned. These regions have 20 km radii in the 
case of IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) capable airfields 
and 13 km radii for airfields restricted to VFR (Visual 
Flight Rules).
Since it does mot provide for any sanctions or pun­
ishment for noncompliance, the Airport Safety Areas 
standard is often flouted, endangering the lives of air­
men. The regulatory process of this very important 
standard is under way, but, for the time being, activities 
that attract birds continue to go on in the intended Air­
port Safety Areas. Bird density near airfields should be 
considered a safety indicator, since it and flight risk are 
closely related.
The sanitation problems in the city of Macae, where 
several sites are used for open garbage dumps, create 
an attractive environment that promotes the presence of 
undesirable birds such as vultures and gulls. The mas­
sive presence of birds around the airport is a major risk 
factor for air activity in the area.
Collisions with these birds are frequent and their 
outcome can range from a good fright to irreparable 
helicopter damage or a forced landing. A bird collision
with a helicopter windshield may break it and injure 
pilots and passengers. Birds can also be sucked into a 
turbine and damage it enough to force single-engine 
flight or a brusque maneuver with possible disastrous 
consequences.
Pilots report that because of the birds they are re­
quired to pay double attention and that over time they 
start to recognize the behavior differences between 
some species of birds.
3.2.2. Operating environment
3.2.2.1. Distance from hangar and offices to the
helicopter
When there are no available spots in front of the 
company’s hangar, the aircraft park at the far end of the 
airport, about a half mile away. The crew has to walk 
up to 8 minutes.
“( . . .)  It is almost one km from here to there, an 
almost 10 minute walk. When there is no space in 
front you park on the other side and you only have 
half an hour between flights. From there to here 
you’ve blown ten minutes. You get here and still 
need to attend to post-flight maintenance, check the 
fuel and other items, and go back there to open [the 
aircraft] for passengers, which takes 7-8 minutes, 
and all of it in the sun ( . . . ) ”
“( ...)  But sometimes he (the pilot) sits there and 
tells us (the co-pilot) to walk over here, like a 
camel..
Pilots and passengers have no way to get around on 
the apron other than on foot. There are some small 
tractors and carts, but they are for the exclusive use of 
maintenance crews and transporting baggage. Macae 
airport is about one kilometer long, and none of the 
apron is sheltered from the sun. Due to the large num­
ber of aircraft in operation it is necessary that the whole 
apron area be used to park aircraft. It is not uncommon 
for a crew whose hanger is at one end of the field to be 
assigned to park their aircraft at the other end. Or be it, 
dressed as pilots, in uniform trousers and shirts, they 
walk up to about 15 minutes under the Rio de Janeiro 
summer sun [between flights].
There is no doubt this situation puts a lot of wear 
on the pilots. Wear that seems unnecessary, given the 
numerous alternative means of transport that could be 
deployed to spare them, a point they are keenly aware 
of. This constraint is closely related to the “short inter­
val between flights” constraint, and addressing it would 
address that one as well.
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Fig. 3. View from the half way mark between the office and the aircraft.
3.2.2.2. High temperatures inside the cockpit
“( . . .)  And what other factors That make you 
tired?”
“Besides the stress there is also temperature, what 
with that sun out there. Nowadays even in agricul­
ture tractors have air-conditioning, because if not
workers don’t produce well. It’s much more tiring 
>»
“Don’t the aircraft have air conditioning?”
“No, our air conditioning is to fly a little higher. 
Not even the newer aircraft [have airconditioning]. 
It’s so as to keep the weight down. Besides being 
a device that can malfunction, and ground the air­
craft. It will increase weight maybe about 30 kilos, 
but I think the main issue is maintenance as it can 
be one more source of problems ( . . . ) ”
The aircraft are not air conditioned. Equipment cost 
has negligible impact on the initial cost of the air­
craft, but its weight reduces the load carrying capacity 
of the helicopter and it generates undesirable mainte­
nance. Pilots and co-pilots constantly mention the wear 
on them from working in high temperatures. Delays 
due to the intense air traffic at the airport force pilots 
to wait long periods for permission to start taxi and 
takeoff procedures, and temperatures regularly exceed 
40°C inside the cabin while the aircraft is parked on 
the apron at Macae airport. In extreme cases the wait 
can reach 45 minutes.
3.2.2.3. Excessive vibration in the cockpit
“( . . .)  The beginning of a breakdown is almost al­
ways vibration. If the Captain keeps flying with 
above normal vibration, he will do harm to the 
whole helicopter and breakdowns will happen one 
after another. Even the organs of the human body 
are affected, because each of them works on a fre­
quency. And then one arrives [home] at night and 
goes to bed more weary than normal, and doesn’t 
know why ( . . . ) ”
This constraint is more prevalent in older aircraft. In 
the case of Macae, the older aircraft that generate pi­
lots’ complaints are the Bell 212 and Bell 412 mod­
els. The quality of the flight is directly affected by their 
vibration. Passengers feel queasy, and the crew expe­
riences above normal fatigue. Pilots also mention the 
possibility that vibration can cause problems in other 
equipment, jeopardizing flight safety. Many pilots ad­
vocate the retirement and replacement of the Bell air­
craft by the more modern S-76A and S-76C +  aircraft.
3.2.3. Economic environment
3.2.3.1. Budget constraints in maintenance operations 
Conflicts among pilots, mechanics and inspectors 
were reported. If the Captain writes in the Aircraft 
Log Book that there is a problem in the aircraft, it is 
then necessary to ground it (Revenue/contract issues?) 
and perform the maintenance. Otherwise, the company
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Fig. 4. A sample map from among those provided by the operating companies (source: pilots).
may be fined by the regulator. So sometimes pilots 
don’t write equipment problems or malfunctions in the 
Aircraft Log, and report it informally -  directly to a 
mechanic -  (inconsistent) to keep flying under MEL 
(Minimum Equipment List) rules. This goes on until 
the pilot cannot stand it anymore and decides to report 
it officially. Besides Safety, there is also a conflict with 
mechanics.
“( . . .)  Sometimes we have to stop an aircraft to 
get some larger repair service done and the guys 
(mechanics) keep trying to patch over the problem. 
( . . .)  they waste time and don’t solve the problem. 
Until we say, OK, enough, now this really has to 
happen. We hammer a long time on something ev­
eryone knows about: pilots know, mechanics know, 
the administration knows that it’s no use [patching] 
anymore, it has to be replaced.”
“( . . .)  But there are equipment failures that cause 
an aircraft no not comply with the MEL (Mini­
mum Equipment List) requirements, and the air­
craft should be made unavailable, grounded. That’s 
why pilots sometimes don’t record equipment mal­
functions immediately in the logbook. But there are
breakdowns that maintenance doesn’t repair due 
to the lack of replacement parts. So they go into 
patching mode and do something about the prob­
lem, but half an hour later, it goes bad again. About 
then pilot and co-pilot get stressed because the 
flights become dangerous. There comes a moment 
when the pilot gets fed up because they aren’t do­
ing anything and records the issue in the aircraft’s 
logbook, making the aircraft unavailable.
There’s an aircraft out there, XXX (prefix deleted), 
which has recurring problems, where it sometimes 
gives off a violent burning smell, returns to base, 
and mechanics find nothing ( . . . ) ”
Like any business, air taxi companies (the helicopter 
operators) are always on the lookout for opportunities 
to reduce maintenance costs. The cost of maintaining 
helicopters of the size used in offshore passenger trans­
portation operations is huge. Besides the high price 
of the parts themselves, there are also the expenses 
of maintaining a crew of highly qualified maintenance 
and specialized professionals, among others. Addition­
ally there are extended maintenance downtimes due to 
parts unavailability on the domestic market. During its
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Fig. 5. Sample (front) of the Campos Basin map most pilots there use, prepared and sold by a fellow pilot (source: pilots). (Colours are visible in 
the online version of the article; http://dx.doi.org/10.3233AVOR-152021)
downtime an aircraft generates no revenue and if it ex­
ceeds contractual allowances on unavailability it will 
incur stiff penalties. It is worth noting that Petrobras’ 
contracts for its passenger offshore air transportation 
services bind specific aircraft, which therefore cannot 
be interchanged even for another identical one.
Sometimes companies’ withholding of maintenance 
department funds seems exaggerated. There are situa­
tions where due to a company instruction certain rou­
tine procedures cease to be performed. An extreme ex­
ample was provided during one of the interviews: a pi­
lot or co-pilot notices a little play on the joystick and 
communicates it to the aircraft mechanic upon return­
ing to the hangar; on his next flight he notices the play 
again and repeats the process, only to find out some­
time later that there is a company instruction stipulat­
ing that such errors should be ignored until the required 
replacement parts are on hand so as to avoid the aircraft 
be grounded while the parts are procured.
This drives a double constraint: the aircraft will op­
erate below optimum for longer than ideal, and pilots 
and mechanics will be at loggerheads because of the 
necessarily unclear communication where mechanics 
seem to accept a task but are in reality unauthorized to 
comply.
If the situation becomes extreme the pilot may wield 
his power to impose action by reporting the issue in the 
aircraft’s log as mentioned earlier. Every aircraft has a 
logbook that is registered to it at the DAC (Civil Avi­
ation Department) and which is verified regularly. Be­
sides the routine entries made in the logbook, a pilot 
or co-pilot can describe a failure detected during his 
last flight. From that moment on the aircraft becomes 
unavailable for flight until the defect is corrected. Pi­
lots are well aware of the downside of resorting to a 
logbook entry to tip maintenance’s hand: conflict with 
maintenance and possibly dissatisfied management.
The situations described above make clear that it is 
necessary to establish viable limits to control spend-
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Tabela de Pitch, Roll e Heave uso obrigatdrio Petrobras
Equ ipamen tos S61 B212 SK7 6 365N BO 105
AS332 B412 Tipol Tipo2
Diurno Pitch/Rol] 2 8 3* 3 a 2s 4s 5s
Heave 3m 3m 3m 3m 3m 3m
Noturno Pitch/Rol] 1“ 1,5s 1,5 s 1,5“ 2s 2,5s
Heave 1,5m 1,5m 1,5m 1,5m 1,5m 1,5m
Obs:Navios relacionados,
TIPOl, Seaway Herrier, Toisa Sentinel,
__________ Sunriser, Seaway Condor_____________
TIP02, BGL-1, Comander 2000, Toisa Mariner,
Loch Nagar
FreqUecias de NDB das unidadcs maritimas. 
Caracteristicas dc Helipontos 
MAIOR HELICOPTERO A POUSAR:
BELL 212 ou 412= P-03 1674// S-61N =P-03 1674 AS332=P-03 1674
P-03 1674
P-07 1625 P-08 1625 P-09 1644 P-10 1610 P-12 1659
P-13 1671 P-14 1620 P-15 1659 P-16 1626 P-17 1650
P-18 1674 P-19 1644 P-20 1670 P-21 1665 P-22 1695
P-23 1657 P-24 1647 P-25 1695 P-26 1644 P-27 1644
P-31 1644 P-32 1644 P-33 1644 P-34 1637 P-35 1644
P-36 P-37 P-40 P-47 1644
SS-01 1677 SS-06 1686 SS-08 1686 SS-11 1605 SS-18 1659
SS-24 1726 SS-25 1726 SS-27 1625 SS-34 1640 SS-36 1695
SS-37 1641 SS-39 1680 SS-40 1700 SS-41 1715 SS-42 1677
SS-43 1650 SS-44 1671 SS-45 1677 SS-46 1746 SS-47 410
SS-48 1738 SS-49 1670 SS-50 350 SS-51 1677 SS-52 1680
SS-53 1650 SS-54 1680 SS55 SS-56 SS-57
PNAJ 390 PNA2 1662 PCH1 1715 PCH2 1720 PGP1 375
PCP1 1689 PCP2 1700 PVM1 1655 PVM2 1645 PVM3 1655
PCE1 1674 PPG 1 1683 PGP1 PPM1 280
NS-07 NS-09 1635 NS-11 1615 NS-14 1740 NS-15 366
NS-16 1620 NS-17 1650 NS-18 1657 NS-19 1680 NS-20
NS-21 1680 NS-22 NS-23 NS-24 SCON 1648
FLEX 1645 SUNR 1650 STMA 1730 TOSE 1653 LOCK 1735
ESPF SE1L JRPM FPS2
Frcqiidncias dc VHF de algumas unidadcs maritimas cm 131.45
FLEX MAYO STMA STEP STCO SUNR TOSE TOMA SOCO
NS-07 NS-09 NS-11 NS-14NS-15 NS-16NS-17 NS-18 NS-19 NS-20 NS-21 NS-22
wc.:m
Sfmbolos das unidadcs maritimas da Petrobras.
Estes simbolos sao para que o piloto identifique 
as unidades maritimas 'a  dist&ncia pelo seu perfil 
com mais clareza.
~L- Navio Sonda 
JaquetaFixa
X, Platafonna Flutuantc dc Pcrfura^ao 
f l  Plataforma Flutuantc de Produ$ao 
|  Navio dc Transporte ou Produ^ao
Este mapa foi Projctado c Impresso pelo 
Cmtc. Georges Sandzer para fins didaticos, 
com as coordenadas fomccidas pela 
Petrobras DPSE-DtRTRAN-SENTRAP.
Com uma tiragem quinzcnal estc mapa 
vem sendo confeccionado regularmentc 
desde 18/08/1995, para os pilotos de 
hclicdptero da base Macae.
Qualquer informasao adocional favor 
entrar cm contato com Cmtc. Georges,
(22) 2732-9547
Informagao e seguranga para todos
Fig. 6. Sample (back) of the Campos Basin map most pilots there use, prepared and sold by a fellow pilot (source: pilots).
ing on maintenance. One cannot lose sight of the idea 
that, in the case of offshore air transportation, this line 
is thin, and if poorly managed can lead to irreparable 
damage.
3.23.2. Budget constraints in flight operations (pilot 
income issues)
“(•..) There are pilots who neglect flight safety to 
be able to fly more ( . . . ) ”
“( . . .)  There are cases -  with older machines -  
where the pilot knows he should stop the aircraft 
due to excessive vibration, but doesn’t and leaves 
the maintenance period for the other crew so as to 
earn more. This is bad because although he gets to 
fly a lot some fortnights, other fortnights another 
crew may do the same to him and he will spend the 
time waiting for the aircraft to be repaired ( . . . ) ”
The companies studied adopt varying pay poli­
cies where some [significant] portion of pilots’ and 
co-pilots’ pay is variable and determined by hours 
flown. Under these policies each professional receives 
a salary composed of a fixed portion whose value 
varies according to job function, seniority etc., plus an 
amount linked to hours flown during the fortnight. The 
actual hourly rates vary between companies and be­
tween pilots and co-pilots. Considering pilots’ hourly
wages to be about twice those of co-pilots, and the vari­
able portion of co-pilots’ pay to account for up to 40% 
of their total compensation excluding benefits are use­
ful approximations. This can be seen in the table be­
low. This policy aims motivate pilots and co-pilots to 
fly as much as possible during the fortnight they are in 
Macae.
In theory the effort of pilots and co-pilots to maxi­
mize their billable hours would not be harmful to the 
system as the system itself would work to define and 
restrict the number of hours possible. However, part of 
the system’s feedback loops on the state of its equip­
ment depends on pilots and co-pilots providing this 
information. This creates a conflict, as pilots and co­
pilots are encouraged to fly as much as possible while 
being given the task of deciding when to make an air­
craft unavailable due to maintenance, and thereby take 
a pay hit.
The following hypothetical situation was provided 
by a co-pilot. A pilot and a copilot make the first flight 
of the fortnight and realize a there is a flaw in some 
sensor. Considering flight safety, the ideal measure to 
be taken would be to inform the maintenance depart­
ment and hand the aircraft over to them for mainte­
nance. However, this intervention may take the entire 
fortnight, leaving the pilot and co-pilot with very few
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Conferido por em 871/2006 08:23:20
l*LA.NE.IAMF,lSTO PE V6 0  VISUAl, j
A T E N ^ A O :  P L A N O  D E  V 6 0  E M  F A S E  D E  T E S T E S .  
NAO D E V E  S E R  U S A D O  C O M O  PLANO OFICIAL.
Helicdptero:
Cliente: PETROBRAS
Data: 8/1/2006(F) Viagcm: H H B H  
Natureza: T6xl A6reo
Piloto em Comando: 
Co-Piloto:
Etapa # Origem D cstino^ Tempo CorrepSo Total Proa NM
Combustivel
remanescentc
01 SBME P-33 1315» 00:46 00:07 00:53 113* 97 783 lbs
02 P-33 SBME 00:46 00 11 00:57 293a 97 270 lbs
Tempo total de vdo: 01:50 00:30 » 02:20
Combustivel necessario: 1 260 lbs
Peso disponivcl: 2082 lbs M 944 Kg
Peso real PAX/CARGA: 1.120 lbs
Peso bdsico operacional: 7.158 lbs VA: 128 Kt
Peso real de docolagem: 9.538 lbs
Peso m&ximo de docolagem: 10.500 lbs para 25 graus
FAVOR DEVOLVER ESTE PLANO DE VdO JUNTO COM A DOCUMENTAQAO
06 08 00
SOME (06) P-33 (08) SBME (00) 
00 06 06
Fig. 7. Facsimile of a Flight Planning Report with identifiable elements suppressed. ‘There-and-back’ flight (source: pilots).
billable hours and consequently less pay in the given 
month. Another option is to continue flying without re­
porting the troubled sensor, hoping it won’t be needed, 
and then report it to maintenance near the end of the 
fortnight, leaving the next fortnight’s crew to deal with 
the aircraft’s unavailability.
The decision to notify maintenance could lead to the 
loss of up to 40% of the month’s pay, depending on 
the company in question and pilot pay-scale. The frac­
tion of co-pilots’ compensation that varies due to ac­
tual hours flown can be as high as 30%.
3.2.4. Socio-emotional environment 
3.2.4.1. Pilot/co-pilot relationship
Airmen see themselves as belonging to different 
classes, among which there are relationship problems. 
There is rivalry between the civilian and military avi­
ators, and, among the latter, rivalry between the avia­
tors from different forces. These rivalries can become 
problems when they collide with the rank distinction 
between pilots and co-pilots (captain and crew, respec­
tively) in the Campos Basin helicopter offshore pas­
senger transportation service companies, where local 
experience and service time count more than overall 
experience or service time. Besides the class rivalries, 
there are personality issues between some of the avi­
ators. Some co-pilots report having relationship prob­
lems with certain captains. Many of the captains are 
aloof, unwilling to teach, and resentful of criticism and 
suggestions. There were reports of cases where there 
was no dialogue between pilot and co-pilot other than 
that required by flight procedures for the full fortnight 
of their tour together.
Intra-crew hostility is highly detrimental to safe fly­
ing, and there is at least one company working on this
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PSgina 1 de 1
_________________ Conferido por conferente em dd /m m /aaaa hh:mm:ss
PLANEJAMENTO DE VOO VISUAL # 999999
A T E N p A O : P L A N O  DE V O O  EM FA SE DE TE S TE S .
N A O  D E V E  SER U S A D O  C O M O  P L A N O  O F IC IA L .
Helicdptero: PP-PPP Data: dd/mm/aaaa Viagem : 999-999
Cliente: petrobrAs Natureza: Taxi A6reo
Piloto em  Comando: Comandante
Co-Piloto: Co-Piloto
Eta pa # Origem Destino VHF Tem po Corre$ao Total Proa
Combustivel 
NM Rem anescente
01 SBME PVM1 131275 00:42 00:07 00:49 104° 83 1.519 lbs
02 PVM1 PVM2 131275 00:02 00:08 00:10 235° 1 1.400 lbs
03 PVM2 PVM3 131275 00:01 00:08 00:09 247° 1 1.293 lbs
04 PVM3 PGP1 131275 00:07 00:08 00:15 232° 13 1.115 lbs
05 PGP1 PPG1 131275 00:05 00:08 00:13 56° 9 961 lbs
06 PPG1 SBME131275 00:40 00:11 00:51 288° 80 356 lbs
Tem po total de vdo: 02:27 + 00:30 = 02:57
______________________________ ADVERTENCIAS_____________________________
- O peso real esta m aior do que o peso m axim o de decolagem  calculado
- O piloto nao esta em  periodo de escala
- A  aeronave nao opera com o si stem a xpto______________________________
Combustivel necess^rio: 2.100 lbs
Peso disponivel: 1.880 lbs = 944 Kg
Peso real PAXCARGA: 1.880 lbs
Peso basico operacional: 7.906 lbs VA: 128 Kt
Peso real de decolagem : 11.886 lbs
Peso m dxim o de decolagem : 11.886 lbs para 25 graus
FAVOR DEVOLVER ESTE PLANO DE VOO JUNTO COM ADOCUMENTAQAO
10 00 00 00 00 10 00
SBME (10) PVM1 (08) PVM2 (06) PVM3 (04) P Q P \  (02) PPG1 (10) SBME (00)
00 02 02 02 02 02 10
XXX Nome do Fornecedor
Fig. 8. Six leg flight Flight Planning Report simulated with real data (source: authors, content: pilots).
issue. As yet, the focus of their work is still toward un­
derstanding the phenomenon, rather than implement­
ing any practical measures. Although our access to 
their work on cabin hostility was restricted, it was clear 
from interviewing the psychologist responsible for the 
work that the company considers this area to have great 
potential to improve flight safety.
Many of the people interviewed are aware of the 
CRM work going on at different levels and its impor­
tance. but are also frustrated with the persistence of 
problems.
3.2.5. Operations issues 
3.2.5.1. Flight schedules
The interval between successive flights of a same 
crew is only 30 minutes. During this time the crew 
must complete and file a post-flight report and perform
a series of tasks to prepare for the next flight such as 
checking the weather forecast, preparation of a flight 
plan, giving refueling instructions. If we take into ac­
count the time needed for the crew to walk from the 
aircraft’s parking position to their company’s offices, 
it’s possible to find there is not enough time for a quick 
break or a simple coffee. Even going to the bathroom 
can end up being done in a rush.
If we consider a day during which pilots have sev­
eral flights, the only rest interval is lunch time. This 
does not seem to be the ideal situation for an activity 
in which it’s necessary to deal with constant stress and 
pressure.
3.2.5.2. Rapid changes in flight planning
Most of the pilots reported being surprised by 
scheduling plan changes during flight operation. These
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C o n fe r id o  p o r  c o n fe re n te  e m
P6gina 1 de 1
d d /m m /a a a a  h h :m m :s s
PI.ANE.IAM K M O  P E  VOO VISUAL # 999999
A T B N Q A O : P L A N O  0 6  V 0 Q  E M  E A S E  0 6 T E S T E S .
N A O  D E V E  S E R  U S A D O  C O M O  P L A N O  O F I C I A L .
D ata : dd/m m /aaaa V ia  g e m : 999-999
N a tu re z a : Taxi Aereo
P ilo to  e m  C o m a n d o : 
C o -P ilo to :
Com andante
Co-P ilo to
Eta pa  # O rig e m D o s tin o  VHP T e m p o i C o rre g a o T o ta l P roa
__ C o m b u s tiv e l__
NM R e m a n e sce n te
01 SBM E PVM1 01275 00:42 00:07 00:49 104° 83 1.519 lbs
02 PVM1 P VM 2 131275 00:02 00:08 00:10 235° 1 1.400 lbs
03 PVM 2 P VM 3 O'278 00:01 00:08 00:09 247° 1 1.293 lbs
04 PVM 3 PGP1 01275 00:07 00:08 00:15 232° 13 1.115 lbs
05 PGP1 PPG1 01275 00:05 00:08 00:13 56° 9 961 lbs
06 PPG1 SBM E 01275 00:40 00:11 00:51 288° 80 356 lbs
T e m p o  to ta l de  v 6 o : 02:27  + 00:30 = 02:57
ADVERTIiNCIAS
- O  peso  re a l esta  m a io r  d o  que  o  p eso  m a x im o  de  d e c o la g e m  c a lc u la d o
- O  p ilo to  n 3 o  esta  e m  p o r io d o  de  e sca la
• A  a e ro n a v e  n a o  o p e ra  co m  o si ste rna  x p to
C o m b u s tiv e l n ece ss& rio : 
P eso  d is p o n lv e l:
2.100
1.880
lbs
lbs 944 Kg
P eso  re a l P AX C A R G A : 1.880 lbs
P eso  b a si co  o p e ra c io n a l: 7.906 lbs V A : 128 Kt
P eso  re a l de  d e c o la g e m : 11.886 lbs
P eso  m a x im o  de d e c o la g e m : 11.886 lbs p a ra 25 graus
FA VO R D E V O LV E R  E S T E  P LA N O  DE V O O  J U N T O  C O M  A D O C U M E N T A Q A O
6th fold 
'( i f  necessary)
N om e d o  F o rn e c e d o r
"M ounta in " fold 
"V a ley" fold
A lignm ent o f folded edge
Hems represented in grey are hidden during flight
Fig. 9. Folds (‘Origami’) used by some pilots to accommodate the Flight Planning Report format to the format of the clipboards used aboard 
(source: authors).
changes are communicated by radio and have serious 
consequences on pilot’s workload. Pilots’ mental rep­
resentation must be changed in order to deal with these 
new tasks’ cascades.
“( . . .)  You get out of here with everything ready, all 
right, I go to such a place, caught many passengers, 
etc. Then on the way the radio reports a change in 
schedule. I usually walk away with everything just 
right, with flying around the head. I have to take 
off here, warning here, this radial. Changes when 
I get lost. Okay, now where do I go? What do 1 
do? Changes all in your head. For me it greatly in­
creases the stress ( . . . ) ”
3.2.5.3. Lack of standardized identification of the 
production units
According to Brazilian Navy procedures the oil rig 
identification must be written in the helipad decks in­
stead to be on the rig sides that facilitates an identifi­
cation anticipation process. This change according to 
pilots will improve the operation safety in the region.
“( . . .)  On this issue the landing, a big problem I see 
now is that there is proper identification. There is 
no standardization, it is sometimes very difficult to 
identify the ship or the correct platform ( . . . ) ”
“( . . .)  Have identification on the deck, but it had to 
be more visible and easier to identify. This is a big
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P&gina 1 de 1
C o n fe r ld o  p o r  c o n fe re n te  e m  d d /m m /a a a a  h h :m m :s s  
PLANKJAIWKNTO l)E VOO VISUAL # 999999
A T E N C A O : P L A N O  D E V 0 O  EM  FA SE DE T E S TE S .
N A O  D E V E  SE R  U S A D O  C O M O  P L A N O  O F IC IA L .
B
H e lic o p te ro :  P P -P P P
C lie n te :  PETROEjR A S
Data: dd /m m /a a a a V ia g e m : 999-999
N a tu re z a :  Tax i A e reo
iPtpp
P ilo to  e m  C o m a n d o : C om an dan te
C o -P i lo to :  C o -P ilo to
Eta p a  # O r ig e m D e s tin o  VHF T e m p o C o rre g a o T o ta l P ro a
U o m b u s tiv e l 
NM  R e m a n e s c e n te
01 S B M E PV M 1 131.275 00:42 00 :07 00 :49 104° 83 1.519 lbs
02 PVM 1 P V M 2  131 275 00:02 00 :08 00:10 235° 1 1.400 lbs
03 P V M 2 P V M 3  131.275 00:01 00 :08 00:09 247° 1 1 .293  lbs
04 P V M 3 PG P1 131.275 00:07 00 :08 00:15 232° 13 1.115 lbs
05 PG P1 PPG 1 131.275 00:05 00 :08 00:13 56° 9 961 Ids
06 PPG 1 S B M E  131.275 00:40 00:11 00:51 288° 80 356  lbs
T e m p o  to ta l d e  v o o :  0 2 :27  + 0 0 :30  =  02 :57
A D V E R T E N C IA S
• O  p e s o  re a l e s t£  m a io r  d o  q u e  o  p e s o  m £ x im o  de  d e c o ia g e m  c a lc u la d o  
- O  p i lo to  n § o  e s ta  e m  p e r io d o  d e  e s c a la
• A  a e ro n a v e  n a o  o p e ra  c o m  o  s is te m a  x p to
C o m b u s tiv e l n e c e s s a r io : 2 .100 -lbs
P e s o  d is p o n iv e l: 1.$8d \bps = 944  K g
P e s o  re a l P A X C A R G A : 1.880 lbs
P e s o  b & s ic o  o p e ra  c io n a i: 7 .906 lbs V A : 128 K t
P e s o  re a l t ie  d e c o ia g e m : 11.886 lbs
P e s o  m & x fm o  d e  d e c o ia g e m : 11.886 lbs p a ra 25  graus
FAVOR DEVOLVER ESTE PLANO DE V6P JUNTO COM A DOCUMENTAQAO
-nT!
S B M E  (10)
00
P V M 1 (08) 
0 2
00
P V M 2  (06)
00
P V M 3  (04) 
02
XXX N o m e  d o  F o rn e c e d o r
"M o u n ta in " fo ld  Item s rep resen ted  in g rey  are h idden during  fligh t
Fig. 10. Data transcription strategy used by some pilots to allow the Flight 
(flights with many legs may require a second fold) (source: authors).
problem in small ships. In each ship stays in one 
place and that this identification leads to greater 
difficulty, you have to pay more attention ( . . . ) ”
3.2.5.4. Ship operations
In the case of small ships, the natural difficulty of 
landing on platforms is redoubled. The helipads tend 
to be very high, making it so that even a light swell 
results in large amplitude displacements of the land­
ing site. Another problem is the natural position of the 
vessel in accordance with the ocean currents, which 
does not always mean the best position for helicopter
Planning Report to fit the clipboards used aboard with only one fold
approaches that depend on the wind. Sometimes, pi­
lots are required to request that the vessel be reposi­
tioned. As this is a time consuming maneuver, it is not 
always possible for the aircraft, flying with limited fuel 
reserves, to await its conclusion.
Many pilots suggested gathering the passengers to 
or from these small vessels on larger platforms nearby, 
and use sea transportation for the final leg.
3.2.5.5. Limited contingency fleet
In the Campos Basin there’s no back up aircraft to 
rescue passengers at sea. There is consensus among the
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C o n fe rido  p o r con fe ren te  em  dd /m m /aaaa  hh:m i
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Fig. 11. Areas of the Flight Planning Report used in fuel requirement calculations (source: authors). (Colours are visible in the online version of 
the article; http://dx.doi.org/10.3233AVOR-152021)
pilots of the importance of such an aircraft. In addition 
to the demand voiced by the air-crews for the existence 
of a rescue craft, the same demand has been voiced 
by the Union of Workers in the North Fluminense Oil 
Industry (RJ-Sindipetro).
The rescue helicopter should be able to take-off and 
land on water, carry equipment suitable for rescuing 
people at sea, and have a crew of professionals trained 
for this purpose, and should be on standby during all 
hours of offshore flight operations.
To bolster their case for a rescue helicopter, pi­
lots recounted an incident where after a forced land­
ing in the sea, all passengers left the craft safely and 
were in lifeboats awaiting rescue. Helicopters flying in
the vicinity could do nothing more than observe the 
downed passengers in the lifeboats and report their ex­
act position to air traffic control. By the time the rescue 
boat got the passengers ashore, 5 h 40 min had elapsed 
from the time of the crash landing.
3.2.6. Flight infrastructure
3.2.6.1. Congested radio communications
All the people interviewed complained about the ra­
dio system. Many of them have stories of incidents that 
happened because of miscommunications.
Near the oil rigs there are aircrafts trying to com­
municate with the platform’s radio. At these mo­
ments when communication is crucial it becomes com-
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Fig. 12. Areas of the Flight Planning Report used during a flight (source: authors). (Colours are visible in the online version of the article; http:// 
dx.doi.org/10.3233/WOR-152021)
plicated to communicate clearly. The solution often 
adopted by pilots to communicate to oil rig radio oper­
ator a new frequency they are changing to and to make 
the communication through this new one
3.2.6.2. Flight area map is inadequate
One of the issues cited by the vast majority of 
the respondents was the inadequacy of the Campos 
Basin regional maps provided by the operators. These 
maps don’t use color, which makes it difficult to lo­
cate some important points, increasing pilots’ cogni­
tive load. Moreover, the size of some information items 
is too small to be suitably legible for most pilots, a 
problem that is compounded in the case of some pilots 
who have hyperopia and/or presbyopia.
As an alternative to the company provided maps, 
many of the pilots who fly in the Campos Basin buy
maps prepared by a fellow captain who also flies there. 
He updates them every fifteen days using mapping 
software donated by a consulting company that con­
ducted a study during the 90’s in the region, and sells 
them for an almost symbolic price. This map, besides 
using color, presents its data in a more appropriate 
scale, including a larger scale detail box covering the 
part of the field more densely occupied by the various 
rigs and ships, significantly reducing pilots’ cognitive 
loads.
3.2.6.3. Flight plan form is inadequate
Although flight planning is formally attributed to the 
captain, in practice this activity is shared with com­
pany officers and the co-pilot. The captain nonetheless 
retains ultimate responsibility for all aspects of flight 
planning.
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C onferido por conferente em dd/m m /aaaa hh:mm:!
RIAMENTO DE VOO VISUAL # 999999
A T E N Q A O :  P L A N O  D E  V d O  E M  F A S E  D E  T E S T E S .  
.jilAMGVMeirTfSJCilOTOiv^^
Icop te ro : PP-PPP
C liente : PETROBRAS
Data: dd/mm/aaaa
P ilo to  em Com ando: Comandante
—r, Co-Pi loto: Co-Piloto
V iagem :
Natureza: Taxi A6reo
Eta pa # O rigem Destine VHF Tem po Corregao Total Proa
Com bustivel 
NM Remanescente
01 SBME PVM1 00:42 00:07 00:49 104° 83 1.519 lbs
02 PVM1 PVM2 131275 00:02 00:08 00:10 235° 1 1.400 lbs
03 PVM2 PVM3 13,275 00:01 00:08 00:09 247° 1 1.293 lbs
04 PVM3 PGP1 131275 00:07 00:08 00:15 232° 13 1.115 lbs
05 PGP1 PPG1 131275 00:05 00:08 00:13 56° 9 961 lbs
06 PPG1 SBM E131275 Juan, _ 00:51 288° 80 356 lbs
C  Tem po to ta l de voo: 02:27 + 00:30 = 0 2 : 5 7 ^
<3
__________ ADVERTENCIAS
-O  peso rpai asfca m akw  do o peso m ax im o  de deco lagem  ca lcu lado  
- 0  p ilo to  nao esta em periodo  de escala '>
^ “^ u o m b u s t lv e l necessario: 
Peso d ispon ive l: 
' - ' • '^ ^ P e s o  real PAXCARGA:
2.100
1.880
1.880
lbs
lbs
lbs
= 944 Kg
7.906—T B s " VA: 128 Kt
Peso real de decolagem : 11.886 lbs
Peso m ax im o  de deco lagem : 11.886 lbs para 25 graus
FAVOR DEVOLVER ESTE PLANO DE VOO JUNTO COM ADOCUMENTAQAO
10 00
SBME(10) PVM1 (08) 
00 02
00
PVM2 (06) 
02
00
PVM3 (04) 
02
00
PGP1 (02) 
02
10
PPG1 (10) 
02
00
SBME (00) 
10
XXX Nome do Fornecedor
Fig. 13. Areas of the Flight Planning Report used for administrative purposes (source: authors). (Colours are visible in the online version of the 
article; http://dx.doi.org/!0.3233AVOR-152021)
The data that determine the flight plan are the flight’s 
legs (intermediate destinations) and loads (passenger 
and/or cargo weight), elements defined by the client 
company, as well as the aircraft’s characteristics, and 
meteorological conditions. From these, flight times, 
fuel consumption, and extra fuel requirements are cal­
culated. All flights require an extra fuel provision to al­
low for unexpected events, and the size of this provi­
sion varies according to the rules governing the flight, 
whether visual or instrument flight rules (VFR or IFR), 
which in turn depend on weather conditions.
To support the feasibility of the turnaround time be­
tween flights, and make the pilots’ task easier in gen­
eral, companies perform part of the flight planning 
work. One of the helicopter operating companies to 
which we had access provides crews with computer 
generated flight plans with their flight data filled in as 
well as pre-calculated time and fuel consumption es­
timates and passenger boarding/deboarding tallies in 
reports titled “Visual Flight Planning Report” or “In­
strument Flight Planning Report”, depending on the 
weather conditions.
J.O. Gomes el al. /Ergonomics, safety, and resilience in the helicopter offshore transportation system o f Campos Basin 531
ina 1 de 1
- A aerorfave'rtStrupenr romtTSnSema xpto
sti ve 1 necess£rio: 2.100 lbs
Peso disponivel: 1.880 lbs = 944 Kg
'^ • ^ P e s o r e a l  PAXCARGA: 1.880 lbs
Peso oasfco oper'ddOnai! IBs VA: 128 Kt
. Peso real de decolagem: 11.886 lbs
Pes&'TO^ximo de decolagem: 11.886 lbs para 25£P«S
FAVOR DEVOLVER ESTE PLANO DE VOO JUNTO COM A DOCUMENTAL AO
c—TO"SBME(10)^ £ 0 00PVM1 (08) 00PVM2 (06) 02 00PVM3 (04) 02 00PGP1 (02)
Key c Fuel Calculation 
Flight Operation
Administrative Information
XXX Nome do Fornecedor
Fig. 14. Uses of the data available on the Flight Planning Report (source: authors). (Colours are visible in the online version of the article; 
http://dx.doi.org/! 0.3233AVOR-152021)
Airmen recognize benefits in the computer gener­
ated Flight Planning Reports we analyzed, but are 
quick to point out several shortcomings, and to demon­
strate various strategies to get around those and meet 
their needs. It is possible that the report is being used 
for purposes beyond those of its initial design and this 
may explain the deficiencies pointed out by aviators, 
but regardless of the origin of the condition, it is clear 
that this artifact is inadequate for its current use. We 
have not had access to the development team that pro­
duced the artifact and we have no information about 
the scope of the original flight planning report project.
Several helicopter operating companies have not 
participated in this study yet, and there may be better 
practices and artifacts in use in some of them, but there 
is a consensus among the pilots interviewed that the 
company procedure shown here as an example is the 
most advanced.
Briefly, the prescribed process consists of the car­
rier passing the initial flight specification information 
to the crew, who then obtain any necessary additional 
data and generate operational data to put together a 
flight plan (sometimes two) to file with the AIS (Air­
port Information Service) and to use during flight op-
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PLANEJAMENTO DE V ilO  VISUAL # 999999 Conferldo por_________em dd/mm/aaaa hh:mm:ss
Cliente: PETROBRAS Piloto em Comando: Piloto Co-Piloto: Co-Plloto Natureza: Taxi Aereo
Hellcdptero: PP-PPP Viagem: 999-999 dd/mm/aaaa
Etapa
#
PAX
Embq / Trans- 
Desem porte
Orig / 
Dest
Proa / 
NM
VHF /
Tempo Hora
Corte
Tempo CorregSo Total
Combustlvel
Remanescente
01
+10
10
SBME 104° 00:42 00:07 00:49 2,100 lbs
-02 PVM1 83 131,275 1,519 lbs
02
00
08
PVM1 235° 00:02 00:08 00:10
-02 PVM2 1 131,275 1,400 lbs
03
00
06
PVM2 247° 00:01 00:08 00:09
-02 PVM3 1 131,275 1,293 lbs
04
00
04
PVM3 232° 00:07 00:08 00:15
-02 PGP1 13 131,275 1,115 lbs
05
00
02
PGP1 56° 00:05 00:08 00:13
-02 PPG1 9 131,275 961 lbs
06
+10
10
PPG1 288° 00:40 00:11 00:51
-10 SBME 80 356 lbs
Tempo total devoo: 02:27 + 00:30 = 02:57
Fig. 15. Example of a possible Flight Plan form lay-out within an A5 page format compatible with the cockpit clipboard, with two lines per flight 
leg and space for writing down flight timing events (source: authors).
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PLANEJAMENTO DE V 6 o  VISUAL #999999 Conferldo p o r_________ em dd/mm/aaaa hh:mm:ss
Cliente: PETROBRAS Piloto em Comando: Piloto Co-Piloto: Co-Piloto Natureza: Taxi A6reo
Helicdptero: PP-PPP Viagem: 999-999 dd/mm/aaaa
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#
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Proa / 
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Combustlvel
Remanescente
01
+10 +<?
10 9 SBM E 104° Q737 00:42 00:07 00:49 2.100
-02 PVM1 83 131.275 08:23 42 4 4 6 1.519
02
00
08  7
PVM1 235° 08:2b 00:02 00:08 00:10
-02 PVM 2 1 131.275 0833 3 4 7 1.400
03
00
06  5 PVM 2 247° 08.39 00:01 00:08 00:09
-02 - / PVM 3 1 131.275 08:Ui 1.293
04
00
04
PVM 3 232° 0 8 4 2 00:07 00:08 00:15
-02 PGP1 13 131.275 08:5Z to 1.115
05
00
02
PGP1 56° 23 Otyib 00:05 00:08 00:13
-02 PPG1 9 131.275 ogas 961
06
+10
10
PPG1 288° 0Q3>8 00:40 00:11 00:51
-10 SBM E 80 10:29 356
T e m p o  to ta l de  v o o : 02:27 + 00:30 = 02:57
Fig. 16. Usage example of the possible two lines per leg Flight Plan form showing pilot’s records of events (source: authors).
eration. The flight plan used during flight operation is 
also where any relevant events are generally recorded.
In the case of the sample report presented here, 
in addition to the flight specification information pro­
vided, there is a recommendation of flight rules to 
adopt in light of the current weather conditions and 
an initial fuel requirement estimate. The information 
layout is more appropriate for an administrative than 
an operational report, and the existence of a notice 
warning that the report and its planning are experimen­
tal and should not be used as an official flight plan 
was pointed out by the respondents. Pilots question the 
maintenance of this warning and the reports’ experi­
mental status for over a year, and point out that the 
captain is responsible for all aspects of a flight, regard­
less of whether there is a written warning or not. They 
also complain of the report’s poor use of the available 
space. They are quick to point out that the block of 
lines that provide detailed passenger loading and un­
loading information at each stop, which they refer to 
as up-and-down, seems to have been an afterthought. 
The amount of data that may be present in this re­
port, which may reflect flights with up to 16 legs, and 
which merges data needed at different stages of the 
flight planning and execution process, imposes the use 
of small text and A4 paper.
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PLANEJAMENTO DE V 6 0  VISUAL # 999999 Conferido por__________ em dd/mm/aaaa hh:mm:ss
Cliente: PETROBRAS Piloto em Comando: Piloto Co-Piloto: Co-Piloto Natureza: Taxi Aereo
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01 +10 10 -02 SBMEPVM1 104° 83 131,275 00:42 00:07 00:49 1,519
02 00 08 -02 PVM1 PVM2 235° 1 131,275 00:02 00:08 00:10 1,400
03 00 06 -02 PVM2 PVM3 247° 1 131,275 00:01 00:08 00:09 1,293
04 00 04 -02 PVM3 PGP1 232° 13 131,275 00:07 00:08 00:15 1,115
05 00 02 -02 PGP1 PPG1 56° 9 131,275 00:05 00:08 00:13 961
06 +10 10 -10 PPG1 SBME 288° 80 00:40 00:11 00:51 356
Tempo to ta l de voo: 02:27 + 00:30 = 02:57
Fig. 17. Example of a possible Flight Plan form lay-out within an A5 page format compatible with the cockpit clipboard, with one line per flight 
leg and space for writing down flight timing events (source: authors).
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PLANEJAMENTO DE VdO  VISUAL # 999999 Conferido p o r__________ em dd/mm/aaaa hh:mm:ss
Helicdptero: PP-PPP Viagem: 999-999 Data: dd/mm/aaaa
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01 +1010 -02 SBMEPVM1 104° 83 131.275 07:37 08:23 00:42 00:07 00:49 1.519
02 00 08 -02 PVM1 PVM2 235° 1 131.275 08 .2 6  08.33 00:02 00:08 00:10 1.400
03 00 06 -02 PVM2 PVM3 247° 1 131.275 08 .35  08:41  00:01 00:08 00:09 1.293
04 00 04 -02 PVM3 PGP1 232° 13 131.275 0 8 :42  08:52  00:07 00:08 00:15 1.115
05 00 02 -02 PGP1 PPG1 56° 9 131.275 23 09:16 09 :28  00:05 00:08 00:13 961
06 +10 10 -10 PPG1 SBME 288° 80 09 .3 8  10:29 00:40 00:11 00:51 356
Fig. 18. Usage example of the possible one line per leg Flight Plan form showing pilot’s records of events (source: authors).
The use of small font sizes is a problem as it makes 
reading the text difficult for pilots with presbyopia, an 
as yet unquantified but nonetheless significant group. 
The A4 paper size is a problem because it is twice the 
size of the clipboard available in the cockpit and there­
fore makes it so that parts of the report are not readily 
accessible in flight. As the report layout does not group 
the information needed in flight in a small enough area,
simply folding the report does not solve the problem. 
While some pilots resort to transcribing information 
from one area to another on the sheet so as to enable a 
single fold, others prefer to use multiple folds to make 
the report fit the small format (a complex procedure 
they jokingly refer to as origami), and others are con­
tent to keep flipping the sheet over during the flight. A 
single pilot may adopt any one of the various strate-
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gies to fit the report to inflight constraints depending 
on the number of legs and/or flight time. This lay-out 
issue becomes ever more critical as the number of legs 
on a flight increases. This is so because the data, ac­
tivity and the complexity of the activity increase with 
the number of legs, while the time to deal with them 
decreases, making the lack of space even more present.
In the following pages we present the Flight Plan­
ning report (Fig. 8) and show how pilots prepare it to 
better suit the requirements of inflight use. Figure 9 il­
lustrates the process they call ‘origami’, and Fig. 10 
the process of transcription. As noted earlier, there are 
pilots who use the report as is or just folded in half 
(not represented here). We have also highlighted in the 
illustrations the information necessary calculate fuel 
requirements, to carry out flight operations, and for 
administrative use. Lastly we present these three de­
mands simultaneously, which clarifies the apparent ad­
vantage of adding all elements in a sheet.
Due to the constraints to which pilots are subjected 
during flight, especially lack of space, lack of time, 
and moments of intense activity, the report's disadvan­
tages, namely its physical size, the use of small fonts, 
poor information distribution, and the presence of in­
formation not used in flight, exceed, by far, any advan­
tage to serve various purposes with a single report.
It is interesting to note that although the limited 
space available in flight evidently is a constraint, 
it does not figure among the constraints identified 
through the interviews. This is due to the fact that it is 
accepted by the pilots as a premise, which they label as 
a restriction, but they do not mention it in the sense of 
something that bothers them.
Separating the functional components of the Flight 
Planning Report into two or three separate reports, one 
for flight operation, and the other(s) for flight planning 
and administrative needs, can result in reports better 
suited to their use by reducing the total volume of in­
formation in each report and thereby allowing that in­
formation to be better laid-out according to the dynam­
ics of its use.
With this in mind, we developed two alternative pre­
liminary layout proposals for a Flight Plan geared for 
use while operating the flight. Both layouts have an A5 
form factor. The biggest difference between the two 
layouts is the allocation of one (Figs 17 and 18) or two 
(Figs 15 and 16) lines per leg of the flight. The pro­
posed layouts allowed the use of larger fonts and left 
space for taking notes on about flight events. The two 
lines per leg alternative more so than the other. For 
each layout, an example of how this could be used to 
take notes in flight has been included, with the notes 
represented in blue Staccatto font.
4. Conclusions
We describe how the ergonomics methodologies can 
be used to uncover constraints of a complex system, the 
Campos Basin helicopter transportation system, and 
provide useful insights about system safety and re­
silience. Although the safety record of the personnel 
transportation system studied is considered acceptable, 
our research showed that there is low hanging fruit to 
be picked which can help improve the system’s safety. 
The constraints uncovered reveal that the system per­
formance and behaviors did not facilitate the develop­
ment of buffer capacities throughout the system that fa­
cilitate people’s work and decisions. Our analysis does 
not aim the produce a complete set of recommenda­
tions to improve the system, as the official accident re­
ports try to do. Our aim was to shed some light about 
how the Campos Basin helicopter transportation sys­
tem is actually functioning, because for a system to 
be controllable, it is necessary to know what goes on 
inside it and the ergonomic methodology provide a 
sufficient clear description of the system. We do be­
lieve that without a clear description of the system con­
straints, if we do not known what really happens in­
side it, then it is clear impossible to control it effec­
tively, as well as to provide meaningful recommenda­
tions about specific points or systems functions to im­
prove the safety. To implement specific recommenda­
tions about the need to review and/or to follow rules 
and procedures, to provide more training, supervision 
and so forth, as indicated by accident investigations, 
without understanding the real nature of system oper­
ation, will not produce the desired outcomes, because 
underlying behaviors will be soon drifted again to pro­
duce new unwanted outcomes.
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